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A Relationship in Limbo: Challenges, 




Since its declaration of independence Kosovo has clearly postured itself towards Euro-Atlantic 
integration with NATO, keeping its door open towards Western Balkan states. This integration 
process faces major challenges stemming from different dimensions: NATO’s internal unity and 
its stance towards Kosovo’s political status having direct impact in consensual decision making 
processes; current geopolitical tensions from a global perspective, particularly between the West 
and Russia; and Kosovo’s ability to fulfil NATO’s standards and criteria. These challenges might 
prove very difficult to overcome at least in the current global political and security environment. 
The objective of this paper is to discuss from legal and geopolitical perspectives the relations 
between Kosovo and NATO and the challenges, dynamics and perspective of NATO opening a formal 
integration process for Kosovo.
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Introduction
NATO’s official integration policy for the Western Balkan countries remains 
open, leaving a glimpse of hope for countries like Kosovo to join the 
alliance in the future. Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 
2008 and has since clearly postured itself towards Euro-Atlantic integration. 
However, with four member states1 still refusing to recognize Kosovo as a 
sovereign and independent state, NATO is a divided organization where 
decisions are taken on a consensual basis. Aside from internal issues, 
another obstacle for Kosovo may lie in the fact that the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244 is still in force, with Russia’s stance 
to veto any decision to abrogate it. This may have a crucial impact on the 
ability of NATO to take a decision, even in the absence of internal divisions. 
This becomes evident due to the primary role of, and enhanced relations 
between, the UNSC and NATO regarding global peace and security. Any 
negligence towards the UNSC may trigger negative reactions by Russia 
which in turn might jeopardize NATO’s relations with the UN and thus its 
position in the world, especially outside of NATO’s area. To make matters 
more complex, current deteriorating relations between Russia and the 
West over several issues, perhaps the most important of which is Ukraine 
and Crimea, will make the UNSC even more incapable of taking any 
decision to replace or modify UNSC Resolution 1244, which in turn reflects 
negatively on Kosovo. Ultimately, the integration process will depend on 
the ability of Kosovo to prove itself to be a genuine democratic state, 
upholding the basic fundamental principles of rule of law, respect for 
human rights and development of a free market economy. Good 
neighborly relations and internal stability would place Kosovo in the list of 
security generators, a key category for a country wishing to join NATO. In 
this regard, normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is seen 
as an important step in improving regional peace and security. Inherent 
in this analysis is the future of the Kosovo Army, which is supported by 
Kosovo’s main allies, while being fiercely opposed by Serbia and Russia. 
1 The four NATO member states that still refuse to recognize Kosovo are Spain, Slovakia, Greece and Romania.
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NATO’s mission, enlargement policy and 
partnerships
NATO is a state based organization founded around the idea of collective 
defence2 (Kenan 1947; Dudziak 2012). Its international legitimacy derives 
from article 51 of the UN Charter, allowing for individual or collective self-
defence of states in a world of no supranational state like institution that 
can subsume the will of individual states (UN Charter 1945, Art 2(4)). The 
primary objective of NATO still remains the preservation of security and 
peace of all its members using necessary and available diplomatic and 
non-diplomatic means. According to the preamble of the treaty:
“They [state parties] are determined to safeguard the freedom, 
common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on 
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of 
law”… and … “to unite their efforts for collective defence and 
for the preservation of peace and security” (North Atlantic Treaty 
1949, Preamble).
 The cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 5 stating the principle 
of collective defence:
“… an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe and 
North America shall be considered and attack against them all 
and consequently they…, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked 
by taking forthwith, individually and in concert …, such actions as 
it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore 
and maintain the security ….”3 (North Atlantic Treaty, Art. 5).
In more than 60 years of existence, NATO has invoked Article 5 only once, 
2 The NATO founding document was signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington D.C. by 12 states from Western Europe 
and North America and is referred to as the Washington Treaty or the North Atlantic Treaty (Treaty). It required US 
reassurance in the region at times of wider global challenges. A crucial factor in designing this new American foreign 
policy was played by the US Ambassador to Moscow, George Kennan, who, after seeing the USSR’s tendencies 
and actions in Europe, insisted on a more proactive policy by the US if it wants to save Europe from Stalin. Kennan 
appealed to the President of the US to use all necessary economic and military force to save the Western World from 
Stalin. Kennan’s appeal prompted the development of the so called Truman Doctrine, resting on two pillars: support 
for free peoples resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure; and to preserve the political 
integrity of democratic nations.
3 For more on Article 5 in a contemporary perspective see Botticelli (2002).
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a powerful indicator showing that NATO managed to deter any possible 
attack by its mere existence, its real capabilities and its determination. 
In fact, it was the terrorist attack by Al Qaeda of 9/11 which prompted 
NATO to trigger Article 5 by calling all NATO member states to help the 
US in repelling any attack, in defence of NATO territory (NATO 2015a). In 
another case, after the Paris attacks in 2015, the French President fell short 
of triggering Article 5, even though France acknowledged the terrorist 
attack as an act of war, leading to a state of war between France and 
ISIL (Stavridis 2016). Today, Article 5 is interpreted much wider, in response 
to contemporary challenges such as cyber-attacks as the fifth domain of 
warfare (NATO 2016; Todd 2009; Augustine 2014). 
From its inception in 1949, NATO has grown to become an organization of 
29 fully-fledged member states.4 Article 10 is the core Article of the Treaty, 
guiding NATO’s enlargement, and keeping the door open to any:
 “European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty 
and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area” 
(NATO 2016, Art.10).
On a more technical note, the 1995 Study on Enlargement remains a 
key document laying down basic principles for future enlargement. 
These principles require prospective member states to adhere to basic 
UN Charter principles, uphold NATO values, internal stability, strengthen 
trans-Atlantic partnership, show an ability and willingness to commit 
military and political support to NATO’s future operations, and the ability 
to become a security generator (NATO 2008). To facilitate this process 
for prospective members, NATO designed the Membership Action Plan 
(MAP) to assist aspirant partner countries in their preparations by providing 
advice, assistance and practical support. It enables states to be able to 
provide for security within the alliance and outside of it5 (NATO 2015b; 
NATO Handbook 2006). 
4 Today NATO counts 29 member states: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.
5 Facilitated by the MAP, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia became fully fledged 
NATO members in 2004. Albania, Croatia (2009) and Montenegro (2017) also went through the same process. A 
special Individual Membership Action Plan was designed for Serbia. The MAP still remains out of reach for Kosovo. 
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Furthermore, the current Strategic Concept guides NATO to keep its door 
open for future prospective members: 
“The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European 
democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are 
willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of 
membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common 
security and stability.” (NATO 2016)
Enlargement is backed by a consensual decision making process, 
requiring that no state opposes the inclusion of a new NATO member. 
On the positive side this decision making process has a crucial impact on 
the ability to implement any decisions taken and also preserves NATO’s 
cohesion. However, on the negative side, a decision making process 
based on consensus might prove difficult to achieve, especially as 
membership enlarges. This may harm the unity, ability and reputation of 
NATO to react in complex political situations (NATO 2015c).
NATO’s membership was expanded in seven main rounds during the Cold 
War and after.  Greece, Turkey, West Germany and Spain became NATO 
members during the Cold War, in 1952, 1955 and 1982 respectively. Other 
states from the East of Europe became members in the last four rounds in 
1999, 2004, 2009 and 2016. As the Cold War ended, states belonging to 
the Warsaw Pact, faced with political, economic and military difficulties, 
became eager to join NATO in order to preserve their freedom; thus, 
these states came knocking on the doors of NATO for membership. The 
reunification of West and East Germany marked a particular feature which 
saw a former state of the Warsaw Pact becoming part of NATO (Walker 
2015). Montenegro was asked to join the alliance in the Warsaw Summit of 
2016 and became full-fledged member in 2017 (NATO 2017), placing the 
whole of the Adriatic’s shores under NATO’s control and finally encircling 
the remaining Western Balkan states within NATO’s area.6
From a broader perspective, in 1997 NATO established the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC), representing today a partnership of 50 states 
including 29 current members and 21 partner states. The EAPC’s aim is 
to facilitate enhanced political and security communication between 
6 NATO member states Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Montenegro encircle the Western Balkans 
states Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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NATO and its partners. The partnership focuses on different important 
issues such as management of crisis situations, armament control, safety 
of nuclear facilities, the fight against terrorism, proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) etc. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) does not 
entail any guarantees for future membership; however, it is based on core 
NATO values (NATO 2014a). In 2011, NATO approved a new partnership 
policy in line with the new Strategic Concept which conceptualizes key 
areas of cooperation to enhance political consultation and cooperation 
in NATO missions, reform of the defence sector, the fight against terrorism, 
and countering WMD and related issues (NATO 2014a).
In line with the open door policy and NATO’s willingness to enlarge its 
partnerships, in early 2016 Kosovo’s Prime Minister sent an official letter to 
the NATO Secretary General, asking for enhancement of relations and 
possibly including Kosovo in a PfP program. In his rather vague response 
letter, Mr. Secretary Stoltenberg stated that NATO’s mission in Kosovo will 
remain under its current mandate (meaning under UNSC Resolution 1244), 
but they will seek new opportunities to cooperate with the Kosovo Security 
Forces (KSF). These opportunities include more exchange visits from Brussels 
to Prishtina and vice versa, boosting dialogue and practical cooperation, 
building the integrity of relevant institutions, and partial participation in 
the “Science for Peace and Security” programme (Office of the Prime 
Minister of Kosovo 2017). As good as it may sound, this letter avoids 
mentioning any fundamental and formal enhancement of relations and 
as such it does not give a clear perspective regarding any NATO-Kosovo 
partnership. Also, the letter fails to address any transformation of the KSF 
into a new, formal military structure.
Challenges, opportunities and perspectives for 
Kosovo to join NATO in the current geopolitical 
context
From the formal legal point of view, The Republic of Kosovo has aligned 
itself clearly towards Euro-Atlantic integration. This stance is cemented in 
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the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of Kosovo. The 
Declaration of Independence in its preamble states Kosovo’s reaffirmation 
and wish to 
“become fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic family of 
democracies.” (Kosovo Declaration of Independence 2008)
It commits Kosovo to embrace values which are intrinsic to NATO. In this 
perspective, paragraph 2 of this declaration states that:
“We [the people of Kosovo] declare Kosovo to be a democratic, 
secular and multiethnic republic, guided by the principles of 
non-discrimination and equal protection under the law.” Kosovo 
Declaration of Independence 2008)
Further it commits Kosovo to:
“abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter, the 
Helsinki Final Act, other acts of the Organization on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and the international legal obligations 
and principles of international comity” (Kosovo Declaration of 
Independence 2008).
The principles stated in the Declaration of Independence are further 
elaborated in the Constitution of Kosovo. In its preamble the Constitution 
states the intention of:
“having the state of Kosovo fully participating in the processes 
of Euro-Atlantic integration.” (Constitution of Kosovo, Preamble 
2008)
The constitution declares Kosovo a free, democratic and peace-loving 
country, promising to be a state of free citizens, guaranteeing basic rights 
and equality of all citizens before the law. Article 7 of the Constitution 
stipulates:
“1. The constitutional order of the Republic of Kosovo is based 
on the principles of freedom, peace, democracy, equality, 
respect for human rights and freedoms and the rule of law, non-
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discrimination, the right to property, the protection of environment, 
social justice, pluralism, separation of state powers, and a market 
economy.” (Constitution of Kosovo, Art. 7)
Furthermore, Article 10 establishes Kosovo’s economic system:
“A market economy with free competition is the basis of the 
economic order of the Republic of Kosovo.”(Constitution of 
Kosovo, Art. 10)
Article 17 of the Constitution opens the way for Kosovo to enter into 
international agreements that include agreements for the purpose of 
protection of peace security and human rights. 
1. “The Republic of Kosovo concludes international agreements 
and becomes a member of international organizations.  
2. The Republic of Kosovo participates in international cooperation 
for promotion and protection of peace, security and human 
rights.” (Constitution of Kosovo 2008, Art 17)
Article 125.4 of the Constitution guarantees:
“Civilian and democratic control over security institution…” 
(Constitution of Kosovo 2008, Art 125.4)
Kosovo embraces liberal-democratic values and has taken maximum 
guarantees for the protection of human rights, minority rights and a 
functioning market economy. These values have to be enforced in 
reality; however, formal posture is the first step in the process. Kosovo has 
a peculiar relation with NATO, particularly due to NATO’s intervention in 
1999 (NATO 1999). Since then, NATO has been involved in Kosovo as a 
peacekeeper, however, as a state Kosovo does not yet have any formal 
relations with NATO (NATO n.d.a). Nevertheless, Kosovo has developed 
itself in many areas which might help it fulfil the standards stipulated by 
NATO. This is partially due to KFOR’s presence in Kosovo and its role in 
the development of the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF), and also due to its 
relations with the European Union (EU) (NATO n.d.b). Kosovo is monitored 
on a regular basis by the European Commission (EC), through its yearly 
published Progress Report which analyses the progress made by Kosovo 
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on three main criteria: political, economic and European standards 
deriving from the EU Copenhagen Summit (European Commission n.d.a). 
The Kosovo-EU relationship culminated with the signing of the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement (European Commission n.d.b). Therefore the 
EU, while monitoring fulfilment of standards for its own agenda, indirectly 
impacts the improvement of values falling within the scope of NATO 
integration and which will be very useful in the future when the formal 
integration process begins.
From the point of view of security, NATO’s KFOR mission has been a 
key player in Kosovo, managing the security situation after the end of 
the war in Kosovo in 1999. NATO’s peacekeeping operation in Kosovo 
followed the 78-day air campaign against military targets of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, mainly throughout Serbia and Kosovo, in order to 
stop ethnic cleansing and other human rights atrocities against Kosovan 
Albanians7 (NATO Handbook 2006: 149-152). On 9 June 1999 diplomatic 
efforts managed to broker a Military Technical Agreement signed by NATO 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Following this, UNSC Resolution 
1244, promulgated on 10 June 1999, under chapter VII, established UN 
Administration in Kosovo pending final status settlement. The Military 
Technical Agreement was annexed to Resolution 1244 and KFOR started 
operating under a UN mandate (UNMIK 2017). The main tasks of KFOR in 
Kosovo have not changed a lot since then, and include the following:
• “Contribute to a safe and secure environment;
• Support and coordinate the international humanitarian effort and 
civil presence;
• Support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and 
peaceful Kosovo;
• Support the development of Kosovo Security Force.” (NATO 2017)
Today, KFOR’s mission in Kosovo involves approximately 5,000 troops, 
down from more than 50,000 troops in 1999, still operating under UNSC 
Resolution 1244. These troops assist the UN, the EU and national authorities 
in developing a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo 
7 The conflict in Kosovo resulted with close to 1 million refugees who found refuge mainly in Albania, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo it was estimated that around 580,000 people were left homeless.
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(NATO 2017). A key task for KFOR was to assist in the transformation of 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). KFOR was the main actor in overseeing 
this process, with the help of national authorities in Kosovo. In 1999, the 
KLA was transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) taking on 
civilian duties. Later, in June 2008, NATO agreed to transform the KPC 
into the lightly armed KSF again, with civilian duties such as response to 
crisis situations, assisting responsible authorities to manage natural and 
other emergencies, civil protection and explosive ordinance disposal 
(Wiseman 2001; Clewlow 2010). The KSF works under civilian control by the 
Ministry for Kosovo Security forces, which is also vested with the powers 
of management and administration of the KSF. The KSF is accountable 
to the Assembly of Kosovo and reports through the Prime Minister. The 
Commander in Chief of the KSF is the President of Kosovo (Constitution 
of Kosovo 2008, Art. 84 (12)). A marked feature in the development of its 
operational capabilities was a declaration by NATO on 9 July 2013, which 
determined that “the KSF is now capable of performing the missions and 
tasks assigned to it” (NATO 2013). This may be a crucial moment for the 
next decision to start the final transition, which is the decision to establish 
a Kosovan Army with military responsibilities.
However, Kosovo’s integration into NATO seems to be a very complex 
process with no clear signs of beginning and certainly not ending. This is 
due to many factors but the factors below might play a crucial role:
1. NATO internal division regarding the political status of Kosovo;
2. NATO relations with the UN and the UNSC; and
3. Kosovo’s ability to rise to NATO standards and generate security.
With regards to the first factor, NATO is facing internal division regarding 
the international political status of Kosovo, as 4 out of 28 members do not 
recognize Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state. These states are 
Spain, Romania, Slovakia and Greece. Any of the four non-recognizers 
may block any decision to start a formal integration process. The NATO 
integration process is first and foremost a political process and political 
disagreements over the international political status of Kosovo have direct 
impact on decisions taken by NATO. The case of Macedonia shows how 
one NATO member state, in this case Greece, may block membership 
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of one country due to political disagreements, which in this case was 
the dispute over the official name of Macedonia8 (The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia v. Greece (2011) ICJ General List no. 142).
Nevertheless, a positive comparison case may be drawn in Kosovo’s 
relations with the EU. The EU managed to overcome similar issues with 
its 5 non-recognizing states (all of the four NATO non-recognizers above, 
plus Cyprus), after an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia for regional 
representation of Kosovo was achieved (Office of the Prime Minister of 
Kosovo 2012). This agreement and the whole process of normalization 
of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, facilitated by the EU, had a 
profound effect for this organization to proceed with the signing of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (European Council 2011) with 
Kosovo, the first contractual relationship between Kosovo and the EU 
(Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo n.d.). The question may naturally 
arise as to the use of the same precedent by NATO to enhance and 
possibly formalize the integration process for Kosovo. However, the 
glitch here is that the agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is limited 
to regional representation for Kosovo. The EU is a regional European 
organization, while NATO is not a typical regional organization because 
it is composed of members from both sides of the Atlantic. This broader 
geographical scope lessens the importance of regional agreements, and 
may give an opportunity for NATO non-recognizers to stay their course 
towards Kosovo.
The second challenge arises from the very nature of NATO as a security 
organization and its relations with the UN and one of its main organs 
in particular, the UNSC. NATO, in a broader sense, operates within the 
framework of the UN Charter. The UN Charter identifies the UNSC as the 
principal organ with primary responsibility over peace and security in the 
world (UN Charter 1945, Art. 24). 
To the same effect, Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that 
NATO member states have undertaken to not affect:
8 Macedonia’s official and formal reference by its constitution is The Republic of Macedonia while Greece recognizes 
it with the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which is part of the interim accord signed by the parties on 
13 September 1995. Macedonia sued Greece at the International Court of Justice which came to the conclusion that 
Greece did not have the right to block Macedonia’s bid for NATO membership on the basis of the name dispute. 
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“In any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the 
Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary 
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.” (North Atlantic Treaty, Art. 7)
The relationship between the UNSC and NATO is multifold. NATO 
operates under the UNSC’s mandate in many countries, such as Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq. NATO is also involved in 
supporting UN operations in different parts of Africa, Pakistan and Somalia. 
In 2008, NATO and the UN moved to sign a declaration of cooperation in 
what may be seen as the first step in the formalization of this relationship 
(NATO 2014b).
In this regards, NATO is involved in Kosovo under the umbrella of UNSC 
Resolution 1244, which still remains in force. This resolution sees Kosovo as 
a territory under UN administration, leaving the issue of final status open for 
future discussion (UNSC Resolution 1244 1999). After Kosovo’s Declaration 
of Independence9 (ICJ 2008), the UNSC did not move to abrogate 
Resolution 1244, due to its internal divisions and Russia’s threat to veto such 
a move. In these circumstances, NATO reaffirmed its stance that its KFOR 
mission shall remain in Kosovo based on UNSC Resolution 1244 until the 
approving organ of the resolution decides otherwise (NATO n.d.c). Hence, 
should NATO decide to enter into any formal relationship with Kosovo it 
might raise tensions with particular members of the UNSC, such as Russia 
and possibly China, which in turn may jeopardize relations between NATO 
and the UN in general. The situation becomes more complicated in cases 
when relations between the UNSC permanent members deteriorate. 
Such deterioration might exist today between the West and Russia over 
the crisis in Ukraine and Syria, i.e. from this perspective, Kosovo might 
become collateral damage in a clash of titans over global issues. As the 
current global standing persists, it seems that, in the near future, the UNSC 
will find it very difficult to change its stance and reflect on the reality of 
independent Kosovo having direct impact on NATO’s stance on Kosovo, 
and possibly prolong the current format.
The third important challenge relates to rising to NATO standards and 
Kosovo’s ability to generate security. These are two crucial factors to be 
9 Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008, and the ICJ confirmed that this declaration does not violate 
any provision of international written or customary law, nor UNSC Resolution 1244.
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considered for NATO membership. Paragraph 3 and 5 of the 1995 Study 
on NATO Enlargement stipulate the concept of stability and security and 
how they see a member state at the time they join; new member states 
must commit themselves to democratic development, good neighbourly 
relations, contribute to international security etc.10 (NATO 1995 Study on 
Enlargement 2008, Para. 3 and 5).
Kosovo still has the KFOR presence as peacekeepers to guarantee the 
peace between Serbia and Kosovo, and also Kosovo’s internal security. 
The Kosovo-Serbia agreements on normalization of relations have 
improved the security situation. Among other things, these agreements 
have particular provisions related to the integration of Kosovan Serbs 
within Kosovo (Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo n.d.). The end of 
this process is supposed to bring a situation to the point when relations 
between Kosovo and Serbia would be conducted at the level of a normal 
bilateral relationship with full integration of Kosovan Serbs in Kosovan 
institutions and in daily public life. In turn, this would create a situation 
where the presence of KFOR in Kosovo is no longer necessary. This might 
be Kosovo’s first step towards pulling off its veil of ‘security consumer’ and 
start to make its first steps towards generating security. This would involve 
being ready to participate actively in the region and elsewhere when 
needed, and being capable in this regard.
10 Paragraph 3 of the 1995 Study states:
“Therefore, enlargement will contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by: 
• Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military;
• Fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus 
building which characterize relations among current Allies;
• Promoting good-neighbourly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, both members 
and non-members of NATO;
• Emphasizing common defence and extending its benefits and increasing transparency in defence planning and 
military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national 
approach to defence policies;
• Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values and 
thereby curbing the countervailing tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines;
• Strengthening the Alliance’s ability to contribute to European and international security, including through 
peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority 
of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions;
• Strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic partnership.”
•  Paragraph 5 of the 1995 Study:
• “New members, at the time that they join, must commit themselves, as all current Allies do on the basis of the 
Washington Treaty, to:
• Unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security; settle any international 
disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and 
security and justice are not endangered, and refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
• Contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free 
institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, 
and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being;
Maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance by sharing roles, risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits of assuring common 
security goals and objectives.”
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (80) - 2017
224
Another issue which may come to our attention has to do with the status 
of the Kosovo Security Forces and its transformation into a Kosovan Army. 
This transformation process, considered to be one of the most important 
steps in consolidating Kosovo’s independence, has gathered steam 
recently with Kosovo’s government pushing for the necessary legal 
changes for this process. Constitutional changes, preferred by Kosovo’s 
allies and NATO, require so called ‘double majority voting’, which means 
that the constitutional amendment will only be considered as approved 
if 2/3 of all 120 deputies vote in favour, including 2/3 of all deputies 
holding non-Albanian guaranteed seats (Constitution of Kosovo, Art. 144). 
Non-Albanian communities hold 20 seats out of which 10 belong to the 
Serbian community. This basically gives the Serbian community the right 
to veto any such process (Hopkins 2017). From a broader perspective, 
Serbia and Russia remain heavily opposed to this idea, considering it as a 
threat to regional security and cooperation (Sputnik 2013). On the other 
hand, Kosovo’s main ally, the US, and NATO, oppose any move without 
exhausting proper constitutional amendment procedures, therefore 
halting the whole idea until the Serbian community agrees (Bytyci 2017). 
Therefore, the creation of Kosovo’s Armed Forces remains at a halt until a 
common solution is found within constitutional requirements.
Within these circumstances a question arises as to whether a state needs 
to have a standing army in order to become a NATO member. Article 10 
of the NATO Treaty does not require per se a prospective member country 
to have a standing army. Article 10 reads as follows:
“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other 
European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty 
and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to 
accede to this Treaty…” (North Atlantic Treaty 1949, Art. 10)
In this regard, an explanatory example may be drawn from the case of 
Iceland, which does not have a standing army but is a fully fledged NATO 
member (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland n.d.). Along the same lines, 
the 1995 Study does not require any future member to have a standing 
army while reaffirming the conditions stipulated in Article 10. Paragraph 43 
of this study states that new member states “may” be asked to contribute 
appropriately to the “Alliance’s military force and command and 
structure and infrastructure” (NATO 1995 Study on Enlargement 2008, Para 
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43). As to the concept of giving appropriate contributions to the Alliance, 
this may also include logistical support and other supporting activities to 
the Alliance’s military forces, without the need to have a standing army. 
Nevertheless, establishing a standing army from the foundations of the 
KSF, based on NATO standards, would consolidate the state of Kosovo 
and give it an additional ability to generate security within the NATO area 
and elsewhere in its missions.
In the midst of these challenges Kosovo would benefit a lot if given the 
chance to participate in the PfP programme. This would help Kosovo 
to further realise NATO’s criteria for entry. The next step would be the 
establishment of a Membership Action Plan for Kosovo, which ought to be 
designed according to the needs of NATO and Kosovo. The MAP would 
have a direct and profound impact in preparing Kosovo for membership 
talks. Pending successful and positive results while in the MAP programme, 
the final step would be the extension of an official invitation to start 
membership talks between NATO and Kosovo.
Conclusion
NATO remains the only organization of its kind in the world which 
continues to abide by its original purpose and mission of upholding the 
values of democracy, human rights, the market economy and peaceful 
solutions for international disagreements. In its more than 60 years of 
existence, NATO has managed to preserve the security and freedom 
of its members. It has only once occurred that a member state invoked 
Article 5 of the Treaty, which was related to the 9/11 attacks. This shows 
that NATO’s cohesion, capabilities and determination of its members 
to abide by their commitments has served as an effective deterrent 
force against any possible attacker. Today, NATO is a much larger 
and stronger alliance facing a multitude of challenges. NATO adopts 
its mission according to new security environments and challenges it 
faces, such as the expansion of the interpretation of Article 5 and its role 
beyond its geographical boundaries (Borawski and Young 2001). NATO’s 
open door policy is still active and the case of Montenegro sends an 
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important signal for the countries of the region about future accession 
in the organization. 
Kosovo is still a state in transition, struggling to consolidate its democracy 
amidst the processes of normalization of relations with Serbia and full 
integration of Kosovan Serbs into state institutions and daily life. Kosovo 
struggles to overcome its transition period and become a fully functional 
democratic state. Facing these challenges, Kosovo still needs the help of 
international organizations and NATO. In particular, integration of Kosovan 
Serbs is directly dependent on the state of relations between Kosovo and 
Serbia. Until these issues are resolved, Kosovo remains a consumer of 
security. 
There remain three issues that prima facie seem to prevent Kosovo 
in furthering its integration into NATO. The four non-recognizing NATO 
members continue to keep their oppositional stance towards the 
political status of Kosovo, thus blocking any formal steps towards 
a formal relationship. Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 1244 is a serious 
obstacle. It seems complicated for NATO to overcome this resolution 
to boost the integration process. NATO and the UN have enhanced 
their relations recently and NATO might be reluctant to take any action 
that would trigger negative reaction by any permanent member of 
the UNSC. In the end it is important for Kosovo to overcome its internal 
political instability and its relations with its neighbours, especially Serbia, 
enabling it to become a security generator and thus prove to be an 
added value to NATO. Having these challenges in mind, Kosovo might 
find it very difficult to move forward with an integration process we 
have so far seen applied to other states. Nevertheless, NATO might 
design a sui generis mechanism which would not jeopardize its internal 
unity and also its stance in global relations, in particular its relations with 
the UN. The EU example, by entering into a contractual relationship 
with Kosovo, might just be one example of how NATO can overcome its 
internal division and move forward to place Kosovo in its PfP programme. 
In the meantime, Kosovo should make use of its integration process 
with the EU to also meet standards which are compatible to NATO. 
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On a positive note, Kosovo has made formal guarantees to uphold the 
highest standards related to democracy, human and minority rights 
and the functioning of the market economy. The Constitution of Kosovo 
sets the stage for Kosovo to abide by the values embraced by NATO. 
It is of paramount importance for Kosovo to continue consolidation of 
its state, normalization of relations with Serbia and the development of 
good neighbourhood relations. The role of the KSF might be very crucial 
in consolidating the state, in particular due to its high standards which are 
a result of close monitoring of its development by KFOR. Transformation of 
the KSF into a Kosovan Army would play a significant role in the concept 
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